Abstract. Segerberg's Dynamic Deontic Logic is a dynamic logic where among the set of all possible histories those fulfilling the norms are distinguished. An extension of this logic to obligations (respectively permissions and prohibitions) to do an action before a given deadline or during a given time interval is defined. These temporal constraints are defined by events which may have several occurrences (like the obligation to update a given file before midnight). Violations of these kinds of norms are defined in this logical framework.
Introduction
An important issue in computer security is to have clear definitions of the norms which are intended to influence the behavior of interacting agents (human agents and software agents).
One of the most significant concepts involved in these norms is the concept of obligation and the related concepts of prohibition and permission.
For instance, in the context of data management an information system user may have the right to access his private data in order to check its validity. That means that, by performing some request, he can create the obligation to the information system to deliver these data. However, this kind of obligation is not completely defined if we do not specify a deadline to fulfill this obligation. Indeed, without specification of this deadline it is impossible at a given moment to check whether the obligation has been violated. Moreover, it is worth noting that the definition of the deadline may be more complex than, for instance, a fixed number of days. It may be something like: data must be delivered before the end of the month where the request has occurred.
In other contexts deadlines may be involved in the definitions of prohibitions. For instance, it may be prohibited to disseminate contractors' names before a contract has been signed.
There are many papers in the literature about the formalization of regulations, or norms in general [2, 18, 11] . Some of them have a static point of view and investigate properties (for instance, the obligation for a car driver to have a licence) that ought to be fulfilled in a given fixed situation. They are usually called "obligations to be". Others have a dynamic point of view. According to that point of view it is important not to confuse obligation change [10, 8] on the one hand, and obligations to change a situation, that is obligations to do some actions, on the other hand. The latter are usually called "obligations to do".
Obligations to do combine deontic logic and dynamic logic, and there are several proposals for their formalization in the framework of modal logics [21, 23, 17, 12] . However, as far as we know, Dignum et al., in [15, 14, 13] , and Broersen et al., in [5, 6] , are the only researchers who have taken into account the notion of deadline.
The objective of this paper is to present new formal definitions of obligations to do and related concepts with deadlines 1 . These formal definitions are needed in the field of computer security because these concepts may be quite complex and when a team of computer scientists has to specify pieces of software to check norm violations they have to agree on the definitions.
For that purpose, we have adopted the formal framework that has been proposed by Segerberg in [23, 22, 21, 20] for obligations to do without deadlines. This framework is presented in section 2. Then it is extended to deadlines (these extensions are the new contribution of the paper). We consider two cases: the case where a deadline is specified by the occurrence of a proposition (section 3), and the case where it is specified by two propositions defining an interval for the performance of the action (section 4). In both cases the circumstances where the obligations are violated are formally defined. Finally, we compare our proposal with other similar works (section 5) and possible future research directions are mentioned in the conclusion.
Segerberg's dynamic deontic logic
Obligations to do raise a particular formalization problem with regard to obligations to be. The problem comes from the fact that the formula in the scope of an obligation, just as any formula in the scope of a modal operator, must denote a proposition, and actions are denoted by terms, not by propositions (see [21] ). Then, the argument of an obligation to do operator cannot just be an action.
The solution proposed by Segerberg in [23, 22, 21] is to interpret an obligation to do an action as an obligation to have done this action. Since the fact that an action has been done is represented by a proposition, this fact can be in the scope of an obligation operator. This fits well our intuitions: an obligation to do an action is fulfilled when the action has been done.
The logic is defined by its semantics. The primitive notion is the notion of point, which is similar to a possible world in a Kripke model (sometimes we use the term "instant" to show that we are talking about the world at a given moment). A path is a sequence of points that can be understood as a given evolution of the world.
An event type is a finite set of paths (when there is no ambiguity we will use the term "event"). Each path can be viewed as a particular realization of the event type.
An individual action is a tuple < i, e, p >, where i denotes an agent, e an event type and p a path in the set of paths denoted by e. Intuitively, i is the agent who realized the event type e along the path p.
A history is a sequence of individual actions, which can be finite or infinite, of the form: -ef is the complex event consisting of e immediately followed by f , -pq is the path made up by p immediately followed by q. We say that the histories h and h ′ are equivalent, and that is denoted by
It is assumed that for any given history there is a definite set of possible continuations, where a continuation is an history. The set of complete continuations of h is denoted by: cont(h), where a complete continuation is an infinite history. This set represents the set of possible futures when we are at the last point of h.
It is also assumed that for every h the set cont(h) can be partitioned into two categories: the set of continuations that conform to the Norm, denoted by norm(h), and those that do not. A continuation conforms the Norm if none of the obligations and none of the prohibitions are violated along this continuation.
Sometimes the histories in norm(h) are called the "ideal histories". In formal terms it is assumed that we have:
If there is no dilemma inside the Norm we have: cont(h) ̸ = ∅ ⇒ norm(h) ̸ = ∅ which intuitively means that there is always a future continuation where the Norm is completely fulfilled.
The formal language is the language of a propositional multimodal logic [7] with the following additional modal operators:
[H]ϕ: it is historically necessary that ϕ.
[D]ϕ: it is deontically necessary that ϕ.
[F ]ϕ: it will always be the case that ϕ.
[P ]ϕ: it always was the case that ϕ. The intuitive distinction between the operators H and F is that [H]ϕ holds iff ϕ holds for all the continuations of a given history, while [F ]ϕ holds iff ϕ holds at every point of a given continuation. The meaning of the operator P is similar to that of the operator F except that it is evaluated for a past history.
The meaning of the operator D is similar to that of the operator H except that it is evaluated only for all the continuations that conform the Norm.
The satisfiability conditions are defined using the relation: (h, g) |= ϕ whose intuitive meaning is: ϕ is true at a point which is the last point of the past history h, and the first point of the future history g.
If ϕ is an atomic formula A, we have (h, g) |= A iff the last point of h is in the set of points that interprets A. The satisfiability conditions for logical connectives are defined as usual. For the modal operators we have:
A formula ϕ is consistent iff there exists a set of histories such that for some h and g in this set we have (h, g) |= ϕ.
For any modal operator
Actions are represented by terms built up with atomic actions and the constructors of sequence and non deterministic choice which have the same meaning as in Harel's Dynamic Logic [16] . The constructor of sequence is denoted by ";" and the constructor of non deterministic choice is denoted by "|".
We adopt the following notations. |α|: event type which is the interpretation of the action α. 2 |} For each agent i we have the event-to-proposition operators: does i (α) : i is just about to do α, done i (α) : i has just finished doing α. These operators play a fundamental role since they allow to talk about actions in terms of propositions.
Their formal semantics is defined by:
Now it is possible to introduce the two operators that represent obligation or prohibition to do an action:
ob i (α) : it is obligatory for agent i to have done action α. f b i (α) : it is forbidden for agent i to have done action α. Their satisfiability conditions are:
) where cont 0 (h) denotes the set of h finite continuations and i does α in k is an abbreviation for:
The intuition of the definition of the operator ob i (α) is that if it is not the case that i did α along the history g ′ , then in all the hg ′ continuations conforming the norm the Norm i does α. The intuition of the definition of the operator f b i (α) is that there is no continuation of the history h that conform the Norm where i does α.
The until operator is assigned the intuitive meaning 3 : (until ϕ)ψ: ψ holds from the point where we are until the point where ϕ holds.
Its formal definition is:
If there are several points in g where ϕ holds, (until ϕ)ψ guarantees that ψ holds until the point that is just before the first point where ϕ holds.
If ϕ never holds in the future, it is always the case in the future that ψ holds. Therefore we have the valid formula:
The operator (bef ore ϕ)ψ is assigned the intuitive meaning: (bef ore ϕ)ψ: ψ will hold, and it will hold before ϕ holds. If ϕ and ψ have several occurrences in the future, (bef ore ϕ)ψ guarantees that the first occurrence of ψ will hold before the first occurrence of ϕ. The formal definition of bef ore is:
Therefore we have the valid formula: (bef ore f alse)ψ ↔< F > ψ Then, it can be shown that we have the following valid formulas:
From these properties the intuitive meaning of the obligation operator and of the prohibition operator can be reformulated in the following way:
ob i (α): for every future history, until α has been done, α must have been done at some future point.
f b i (α): for every future history, at every point of this history, α must not have been done at any future point.
Extension to norms with deadlines
The definitions which have been presented in the previous section are now extended to norms with deadlines.
Obligation. We define the operator ob i (α < d) whose intuitive meaning is:
it is obligatory for agent i to have done the action α between the present point and the first occurrence of the proposition d.
3 Here we have slightly modified Segerberg's definition of the until operator.
Prohibition to do an action until a given deadline occurs is defined in a similar way through the operator f b i (α < d) whose intuitive meaning is:
Segerberg's definition can also be found as a special case. Indeed, we have the valid formula:
Therefore, we have the valid formula:
Segerberg did not propose a definition for permission. Such a definition can easily be derived from the definitions of obligation and prohibition. The permission operator is denoted by: pm i (α < d), and it is intuitively defined by:
it is permitted for agent i to have done the action α between the present point and the first occurrence of the proposition d.
It is formally defined by:
In this definition we do not have the condition: (until (done i (α)∨d)). Instead of this condition we have: (until d). The reason is that agent i is permitted to have done the action α several times before d.
For instance, if it is permitted to access a file before the end of the day, after the file has been accessed it remains permitted to access this file before the end of the day.
In the case where the deadline never occurs, that is, if d is f alse, we have the valid formula:
The comparison of pm i (α < f alse) with ob i (α) shows that, for every future continuation, in the case of a permission, the property < F > done i (α) holds at every future point for some normal continuation, while for an obligation it holds until α has been done at some future point for every normal continuation. This is consistent with our intuition.
It is worth noting that
is not an inconsistent formula (it is satisfied when norm(hg ′ ) = ∅), though it is impossible to fulfil both norms. Finally, we can easily show that we have the valid formulas: 
In the case where d is logically equivalent to f alse the above formula can never be true, because < P > (d) is always false. That means that this obligation can never be violated, and that fits our intuition.
It is worth noting that after the first occurrence of d the obligation ob i (α < d) imposes no more constraint. Nevertheless, after d we can have ob.
viol(i, α, d) if a violation has occurred in the past (before d).
Note also that, if α has been done before the instant where the obligation ob i (α < d) has been created, but α has not been done after that instant, the obligation is violated. We can find real scenarios where this position is, in a first approach, questionable.
Let's imagine, for instance, a customer who has the intention to buy some good and sends a check to pay it before sending the order to buy it. Suppose that the regulation states that a good has to be paid after the good has been ordered and no later than one month after this order. According to our formal definition of a violation, the obligation has been violated. This is rather counter intuitive.
In fact this is more a theoretical problem than a practical one. The problem is not that the good has not been paid, but rather that it has been paid "too early". A formal solution to avoid this oddity could be to create the obligation to pay only if the good has not been already paid.
A 
Note that, in the case of a prohibition, a violation may occur before d has occurred.
In the case of permissions there is no violation. Indeed, a permission does not impose to do an action, it just offers the possibility to do an action without any violation of the norms.
There are many practical examples where a norm applies during an interval which is defined by two events. For instance, it may be obligatory to update a file between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m.
In the case where d or d ′ may have several occurrences, it is assumed that the norm applies between the first occurrence of d (say instant t) after the instant where the norm has taken place, and the first occurrence of d ′ after t 4 . Finally, it is assumed that the norm does not apply at the instants where
To characterize violations we have to be able to characterize the instant of the first future occurrence of d. For that purpose the operator < F 1, ϕ > ψ is introduced. Its intuitive meaning is:
< F 1, ϕ > ψ: there exists some instant t in the future where we have ψ, and t is the first instant, since the present instant, where we have ϕ.
We introduce the obligation operator
: it is obligatory for agent i to have done the action α between the first occurrence of d and the first following occurrence of d ′ . Its formal definition is:
This definition can be read: for every future history: -there exists some instant t in the future where: -d has occurred for the first time, and -until we have done i (α) ∨ d ′ : -for every ideal continuation: α has been done before d ′ . The reason why in this definition we need the operator < F 1, d > instead of < F >, is that we have to refer to the instant which is the first future occurrence of d, and not just to some future instant.
Prohibition.
We introduce the prohibition operator
: it is forbidden for agent i to have done the action α between the first occurrence of d and the first following occurrence of d ′ . Its formal definition is: 4 Since we have to consider "the first occurrence of d ′ after t" we cannot trivially define norms that apply in an interval from norms that apply after the first occurrence of d and before the first occurrence of d ′ because it may happen that the first occurrence of d ′ occurs before the first occurrence of d.
: it is permitted for agent i to have done the action α between the first occurrence of d and the first following occurrence of d ′ . Its formal definition is: Fig. 1 . Violations of obligation to do and prohibition to do.
A violation of the obligation ob
)) This characterization of a violation can be read as (see figure 1) : -there exists an instant t 1 in the past where we had d ′ , and -before t 1 we had d at the instant t 2 , and -before t 2 we had ob i (d < α < d ′ ) at the instant t 3 , and -since the first occurrence of d after t 3 , until the first occurrence of d ′ , α has never been done.
A violation of the prohibition
. We formally have:
)) This characterization of a violation can be read (see figure 1) : -there exists an instant t 1 in the past where we had done i (α), and -before t 1 we had d at the instant t 2 , and -before t 2 we had f b i (d < α < d ′ ) at the instant t 3 , and -after the first occurrence of d after t 3 we had done i (α) before d ′ .
Comparison with other works
To compare our work with other approaches that can be found in the literature, we can mention Pörn [19] , who defines formulas of the form: OE i ϕ, whose meaning is: it is obligatory for agent i to bring it about that ϕ. However, the operator E i does not mention which action has been done and there is no formal means to express that the effect ϕ should be obtained before a given deadline. Then, the obligation is violated as soon as we have ¬E i ϕ, and the agent i has no delay to perform some appropriate action. In [17] , Horty and Belnap present a logic where histories have a tree structure, which has some similarities with Segerberg's structures. The main difference is that, like for Pörn, actions are not explicitly represented. They define the operator [i dstit : ϕ] whose intuitive meaning is rather close to E i ϕ, but its semantics makes explicit reference to histories and instants. Deontic notions are represented via the deontic modal operator O, and O[i dstit : ϕ] means that it is obligatory for agent i to see to it that ϕ. Nevertheless, the concept of deadline is ignored.
As mentioned in the introduction, Dignum et al. [15] are among the few people who have explicitly investigated norms with deadlines. They have defined a temporal logic with tree structures and the operator E i ϕ. However, the formal semantics given to this operator is quite different from Pörn's semantics, and, in our view, it is not perfectly clear. Norms are formalized according to Anderson's reductionist approach [1] thanks to a specific proposition that means: "a violation has occurred". Formulas that express obligations to do with deadlines have the form: O i (ϕ < d). Their meaning is: for all future histories, either, until d has occurred, agent i has brought about that ϕ and there is no violation, or, at the next instant, we have d and there is a violation. The strong limitation of this formalization is that in the reductionist approach there is no explicit representation of ideal histories. Moreover deontic modalities cannot be nested with other modal operators. For instance, in the context of a psychiatric hospital, we would like to be able to represent the fact that for some patients it is prohibited to know that it is prohibited to access their own file.
In Broersen et al. [5] , formulas of the form O i (ϕ, d) mean that it is obligatory for agent i that ϕ holds before the deadline d. That could be reformulated in Segerberg's framework as: [H] (until (ϕ ∨ d) )O i ϕ, where O i obeys a KD logic. But there is no explicit reference to the actions, and we see this operator as a representation of obligation to be (rather than obligation to do an action) with deadlines. In [6] , there is no deontic modality and norms are formalized by their violationà la Anderson. We have seen above the limitations of this approach.
Finally, in [3] ,Äqvist presents a logic that combines temporal and deontic operators. In [4] , he suggests to extend it with deadlines. The idea is, for example, to represent that it is obligatory to have ϕ before t 3 by a formula that means that is it obligatory to have ϕ either in t 1 or t 2 or t 3 . This solution may be interesting for some particular applications but it lacks generality. Moreover there is no explicit representation of actions, and, again, the resulting logic would be closer to a logic for obligations to be than to a logic for obligations to do.
Conclusion
We have extended Segerberg's logical framework to obligations, prohibitions and permissions to do an action before a proposition comes to be true or within an interval defined by two propositions. In each case, we have also formally characterized the circumstances where these norms are violated.
The resulting definitions of norms and of their violations are far from being simple and that is why, as mentioned in the introduction, we need formal definitions to prevent misunderstanding between people who have to design computer systems which have to fulfil the norms about security.
Nevertheless these results have to be considered as a preliminary step which clarify semantical issues but should be completed by further works in several directions.
The first direction is about the semantics of other notions involved in norm definitions. In this direction we should extend the definitions to obligations to be with deadlines (for example, the obligation to have digital data for identification on your passport before the end of the year). Another direction is the obligation to have started the performance of an action. For example, the obligation, for a driver, to start to cross the road when the light turns to green. It seems that this kind of norms could be formalized thanks to formulas of the form: does i (α).
The second direction is the automatization of reasoning about norms with deadlines. This requires to define a sound and complete axiomatics of the semantics which has been presented, to analyze its formal properties, like decidability, to design strategies for automated reasoning and to analyze their complexity in the perspective of potential implementations.
